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Abstract
In a world with risk-neutral agents, liability rules will only induce
efficient behaviour if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of
an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or
bilateral activity choices can prevent the full internalisation of
costs. A mechanism is proposed which guarantees an efficient
outcome: monetary fines which are not related to the occurrence
of an accident. Such a mechanism requires individuals to violate
the standard of care in order to trigger fine payments. Hence,
efficiency needs an excessive standard.
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A liability rule is a legal regulation which specifies how damages from an accident are
allocated among the parties involved. The economic analysis of accident law has shown that
liability rules can induce efficient behaviour if these rules assign the full costs of an
individual's action to this agent. In such a case, all externalities which could distort decisions
in the absence of a liability rule are internalised.1 However, commonly found liability rules
may fail on this efficiency requirement. If, for example, the probability of having to pay for
damages, given an accident, is less than unity in a setting with unilateral choices, the
internalisation will be incomplete. Moreover, in a setting of bilateral care and activity choices
a liability rule cannot generally allocate accident costs in such manner as to impose the full
costs on both parties simultaneously. To correct for the inefficiency, broadly speaking, two
approaches have been suggested: first, a payment due to a liability rule is combined with a
fine in the case of an accident. This fine has to exactly compensate for the accidents costs not
born. Second, a negligence rule can induce adherence to an efficient level of care while tax-
like payments provide incentives for efficient activity choices.
In this paper, a further mechanism is proposed which guarantees an efficient outcome: mone-
tary fines which are not related to the occurrence of an accident. The decisive aspect is that for
these fines to be incurred, individuals must violate a standard of care which triggers fine pay-
ments. If the standard is represented by the efficient level of care, optimal care choices will
not warrant this requirement. Hence, the standard of care must be excessive. This mechanism
for inducing efficient behaviour has a central advantage - it can be observed, as for example in
the case of road traffic. This is a typical occupation with bilateral care and activity choices. In
such a setting, common liability rules which simply divide damages cannot induce efficient
outcomes. Instead, virtually all c ountries know fines, for example, for speeding, parking
offences, or jaywalking which have to be paid in the absence of an accident. The model
presented below can explain their existence. These non-accident related fines are akin to 'act-
based' sanctions (Shavell 1993, Polinsky and Shavell 2000). The analysis demonstrates that a
combination of act- and harm-based payments can be used to induce efficient outcomes, but
that efficiency requires an inefficient standard of care in a world of bilateral activity choices.
Section 2 presents a simple model of bilateral choice and shows why liability rules cannot
generally imply the efficient outcome. The solutions which have been proposed in the lit-
erature to remedy this feature are discussed. Since these solutions have often been debated in
the context of road traffic, this example is also used in the present paper. Section 3 analyses
how fines which are independent of the occurrence of an accident can induce risk-neutral
drivers to behave efficiently. Focusing on a setting with unilateral care and activity choices
                                                
1 While a rule of strict liability imposes the full marginal and total costs of an action on a party, a negligence rule
assigns the full costs of an accident to a party only at a specific level of care. While efficiency may only require
the internalisation of marginal costs (Wittman 1981), subsequently, reference is made to the full costs.2
allows to bring out the intuition for the efficiency result most clearly. However, the necessity
to combine liability rules with non-accident related fines in order to induce an efficient
outcome is most compelling in a world with bilateral activity choices. Therefore, an appendix
demonstrates that an efficient outcome can be obtained in a world of bilateral care and activity
decisions. Section 4 considers two extensions to the basic approach:  risk-aversion and
punitive damages. Section 5 discusses the (dis-) advantages of non-accident related fines
relative to other mechanisms for achieving efficiency.
2. The Problem of Bilateral Care and Activity Choices
Suppose a certain type of action - such as participating in road traffic - might cause accidents
which impose costs not only on the party performing the task but also on others. If only one
driver can choose his level of activity and care, an efficient outcome can be obtained if this
driver bears the full costs of his activity. A system of strict liability can, therefore, induce an
efficient outcome. Fines for the violation of standards are not required in order to achieve effi-
ciency. If there is another driver who can also choose her level of care, strict liability for the
first driver will imply that the second driver does not have to bear any of the costs of an acci-
dent. The efficient level of care by the second type of driver can be obtained by introducing a
contributory negligence clause. Once again, fines are not needed to obtain efficiency. How-
ever, if the second driver can vary activity but avoid all liability by adhering to the standard of
care, she will not take into account the variation in expected accident costs due to her choice
of activity. Since liability rules do not condition payments on activity, they cannot induce effi-
cient behaviour in a world of bilateral activity choices (Shavell 1980, 1987). Efficient out-
comes can only be achieved if risk-neutral drivers bear the full costs of their choices. In effect,
a rule of double strict (marginal) liability is required, given that the behaviour of a particular
driver does not affect the probability that an accident occurs between two other drivers.2
Accordingly, efficiency requires the use of an instrument in addition to a liability rule. Double
liability could be achieved if drivers were fined the difference between the actual damage and
the costs which they bear. Thus, the fine which induces efficient behaviour would only have to
be paid in the case of an accident and it would have to reflect the division of damages between
the drivers involved. However, actual fines, for example in the context of road traffic, depend
on care levels and not on cost sharing rules. Instead of fines, (Pigouvian) taxes could be used
to impose the full costs of the activity. Such taxes would have to be a function of care and
                                                
2 Cf. Hindley and Bishop (1983) or de Meza (1986). de Meza (1986) shows that Shavell's (1980, 1987) claim,
according to which there cannot be a liability rule for situations of bilateral activity choices which induces the
efficient outcome, does not always hold. Assume that the activity of driver 1 depends negatively on the activity of
driver 2, and vice versa, and that each driver takes the behaviour of the other as given. Individual behaviour
would then result in the efficient outcome if the excessive activity due to incomplete liability were exactly
balanced by the insufficient activity owing to the activity choices of the other drivers. Clearly, this outcome only
occurs by chance.3
activity. An alternative mechanism to achieve efficient outcomes would be a dual negligence
rule, combined with activity-related payments. In the context of road traffic such payments
could be surcharges on insurance premiums, extra petrol taxes, or road user charges.3
To formalise the above ideas, suppose that there are two groups of risk-neutral agents, referred
to as drivers 1 and 2. All drivers within each group are identical. The groups are sufficiently
large such that potential accident victims do not know each other in advance. Moreover, each
individual driver takes the behaviour of others as given. Drivers face different gains or costs
from driving and, therefore, select distinct levels of care and activity. Let the monetary
equivalent of the gain for driver 1 resulting from an activity level z and a choice of care
denoted by x be given by G(x, z). G is strictly concave in the activity z and reaches a
maximum for some finite level. Moreover, G declines with care at a non-decreasing rate since
higher care implies a greater expenditure, and the greater the care level is, the more expensive
an additional unit of care might become. Finally, the gain from driving will be zero if care
attains its maximum level xmax. The gain for driver 2 is denoted G and exhibits the same
features as that of driver 1. These assumptions are summed up in table 1:
Table 1: Features of the drivers' gain functions
Gain of driver 1 G(x, z) Gain of driver 2 G(y, u)
Care: x, y Gx < 0, Gxx £ 0, G(xmax, z) = 0 Gy < 0, Gyy £ 0, G(ymax, u) = 0
Activity: z, u Gz(x, % z) = 0, Gzz < 0
Gz > (<) 0 for z < (>) % z
Gu(y, % u) = 0, Guu < 0,
Gu > (<) 0 for u < (>) % u
Given care and activity choices of x, y, z, u, expected damages D = D(x, y, z, u) arise.
Damages decrease with care at a decreasing rate, Dx, Dy < 0, Dxx, Dyy > 0, and increase with
activity choices at an increasing rate Dz, Du > 0, Dzz, Duu > 0. One can think of drivers 1 and
2 as 'injurers' and 'victims', respectively, such that expected damages D(x, y, z, u) only affect
one driver directly. However, this simplification is not required for the subsequent analysis of
risk-neutral drivers, as long as also the 'injurer's' damages are covered by the liability rule
(Arlen 1990). Furthermore, and in contrast to the assumptions of the model, accidents can
involve more than two parties. Such multy-party accidents could also be integrated into the
present framework by redefining D(x, y, z, u) as the expected accident costs owing to all types
of accidents.
A liability rule assigns a fraction a (1 - a) of expected damages to driver 1 (2), 0 £ a £ 1. For
simplicity, strict liability is assumed. The parameter  a then describes some institutional
regulation of how damages are shared. If another liability rule were in operation, the basic fea-
                                                
3 See Vickrey (1968), Green (1976), Tullock (1981), Landes (1982), Finsinger and Pauly (1990), Litman (1997),
or Edlin (1999) for a discussion of various such proposals.4
ture of the problem would persist: at least one driver would not have to bear the full expected
costs of accidents. This is because a liability rule simply shares damages and does not allow to
make damage payments depend on activity levels for all drivers at the same time. For simplic-
ity, the parameter a is not conditioned on the liability rule.
The expected payoff W of the society is the sum of the monetary equivalents of the gains for
both drivers less the expected costs of accidents (cf. Shavell 1987):
W = G(x, z) + G(y, u) - D(x, y, z, u) (1)
Maximisation of the expected payoff W with respect to x, y, z, u is assumed to yield a unique
solution. The efficient levels of care and activity are denoted by x*, y*, z*, and u*.
Turning to individual decisions, driver 1 maximises his expected payoff W1, which excludes
a fraction (1 - a) of expected damages.
W1 = G(x, z) - aD(x, y, z, u) (2)
The payoff W2 of driver 2 is defined analogously.
W2 = G(y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, y, z, u) (3)
As long as a < 1 holds, the levels of care and activity which result from the first driver's max-
imisation exercises are inefficient. The same consequences apply for driver 2, as long as
a > 0. Hence, efficiency requires a(1 - a) = 1 for a ˛ [0, 1], which is, therefore, theoretically
impossible. These inefficiencies cannot be circumvented by rules which condition liability on
the drivers' level of care, as any form of negligence rule does, since there always persists an
incentive to choose an inefficient activity level. The central reason for the inability of a
liability rule to induce efficient outcomes in a setting with bilateral activity choices is that at
least for one driver the private costs of activity changes differ from the respective costs to
society; the private costs of additional activity being zero if a care standard is observed (but
see footnote 2).
3. A Mechanism to Obtain Efficient Outcomes
Subsequently, a mechanism is derived which induces efficient behaviour by imposing fines on
drivers also in the absence of accidents. For this mechanism to achieve the desired results, fine
payments have to be incurred even if drivers choose the efficient level of care. Thus, the care
standard needs to be excessive. Equations (1) and (2) - or (3) - show that a model of unilateral
choice with restrictions on liability is analytically equivalent to an approach with bilateral
decisions. In both cases, expected accident costs are not fully internalised. Thus, the
mechanism which can be employed to obtain efficiency is illustrated in a setting of unilateral
choices, imposing value of a < 1. This restriction allows to bring out the central means of
inducing efficient behaviour most clearly. However, efficient behaviour in the unilateral
choice model can be achieved by abolishing the institutional restrictions on liability, that is5
setting a = 1. This is not feasible in a world of bilateral decisions about activity since full
liability cannot be imposed on both drivers simultaneously. Accordingly, the proof that
efficiency can be obtained in such a world by the use of non-accident related fines as well is
also provided.
In a model of unilateral choices, efficient outcomes are determined by the maximisation of the
payoff G(x, z) - D(x, z) due to the actions of driver 1 with respect to x and z. The driver is
assumed to be liable for accident costs, given a < 1. Moreover, he has to pay a fine when
observed violating a care standard. Let the expected fine P be a function of care x and activity
z and suppose, in addition, that it is given by P(x, z) = (1 - a)D(x, z). A fine can be condi-
tioned on the level of care if the extent of the violation of the standard is observable. More-
over, the fine can be made a function of the activity level if care choices of higher activity
drivers are examined more often than those of their lower activity counterparts.
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The usual procedure in the analysis of liability rules is to assume that the standard of care s is
defined by the optimal level x*. In this setting, however, adherence to a standard of care
s = x* implies that the level of activity z is inefficient.4 This inefficiency can be overcome if
drivers always have to pay the expected fine. Hence, the optimal levels of x and z will be
obtainable if drivers can be induced to violate the norm. That such behaviour is indeed
observable can be illustrated by the example of speeding. It is quite common that drivers
exceed the speed limit such that they will incur a fine if being caught. The basis of this
behaviour seems to be the calculation that the expected fine is less than the gain from reaching
a destination more quickly. If such considerations determine the choice of care, expected fine
payments will be positive.
The only standard s which ensures efficient levels of care x = x* and of activity z = z* is a
standard s which is impossible to adhere to. In this case, drivers maximise the first line of
equation (4). The value of s which guarantees that all drivers ignore the standard s and choose
the efficient levels of care x* and activity z* is implicitly defined by two conditions:
G x z D x z P x z G s zs D s zs ( *, *) ( *, *) ( *, *) ( , ) ( , ) - - > - a a  ” A, if xs* < s (5a)
G x z D x z P x z G xs zs D xs zs ( *, *) ( *, *) ( *, *) ( *, *) ( *, *) - - > - a a , if xs* ‡ s (5b)
where xs* and zs* result from the maximisation of the second line of (4), and zs is the optimal
activity given adherence to a standard s and (implicitly) defined by Gz(s, z) - aDz(s, z) = 0.
                                                
4 Note that this inefficiency would be more pronounced if instead of strict liability a negligence rule were to
prevail since adherence to the standard would then imply expected accident costs of zero.6
Condition (5a) deals with the case that the driver's optimal level of care xs* in the absence of
fines is less than the standard, xs* < s. The driver might then maximise his payoff by setting
x = x* or x = s. Inequality (5a) states that the socially optimal violation yields a greater payoff
than the corner solution (x = s, z = zs) and thereby guarantees that the driver benefits from a
violation of the standard. The second requirement (5b) covers the case that the optimal level
of care in the absence of fines is greater than the standard, xs* > s and requires that the
optimal choices of x and z are preferable to an interior solution in the absence of fines.5
The inequality (5b) will no longer represent a restriction if the standard is chosen sufficiently
high. Accordingly, if the driver is characterised by an optimal level of care xs* ‡ s, this out-
come can be prevented by raising s above x s*. By increasing the standard s a driver can
always be forced either to select a corner solution (x = s, z = zs) or to choose x*, z*. To guar-
antee that the driver violates the standard of care, it remains to be shown that a corner solution
x = s is not optimal. A driver who selects a corner solution takes excessive care by
assumption. If the standard is raised further, the costs of adherence to the standard will
increase more strongly with the level of the standard than the gain from doing so rises since
the optimal degree of care has already been exceeded. Eventually there will be a sufficiently
high standard which makes it optimal for the driver to violate this norm and to choose care
and activity efficiently. Formally, this can be seen from inspection of (5a), where the left hand
side is independent of s, since the payoff of a driver who violates the norm is unaffected by
variations in the standard s, while the right hand side decreases with s.
{ } ) s z , s ( z D ) s z , s ( z G
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s dz
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Since the driver chooses activity zs optimally, the expression in curly brackets in (6) is zero.
Moreover, because the required standard s exceeds the optimal level of care xs*, the driver,
while adhering to the standard, would like to reduce care, implying Gx - aDx < 0. Because the
gain G while adhering to the standard s will eventually become zero if the standard
approaches the maximum level of care xmax, by increasing s it is always possible to reduce
the expected payoff of a driver who adheres to this standard. Accordingly, the efficient levels
of care and activity can be induced. This result can be summarised as:
Proposition 1
If institutional restrictions prevent full liability in a setting of unilateral care and activity
choices by risk-neutral agents, raising the required standard of care sufficiently above the
efficient level and fining agents who violate the standard with a positive probability,
independently of the occurrence of an accident, can induce efficient care and activity choices.
                                                
5 Since a driver is fully liable, adherence to the standard does not guarantee that he can avoid accident costs.
Hence, it may be optimal for the driver to select a level of care in excess of the standard.7
The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward: by imposing a standard s which is violated
for certain, the fine P effectively acts as an expected activity-related payment. This is because
every unit of activity z is executed with a level of care which does not conform to the required
standard. If, in addition, the fine P(x, z) mimics the expected costs of an accident, less the
fraction a which drivers have to pay themselves, optimal care will be induced.
It has been argued in the introduction that non-accident related fines are more relevant in a
setting with bilateral activity choices than in one with unilateral decisions. As indicated, such
fines can also induce efficient behaviour in a world with bilateral activity choices. This is the
case for an expected fines P1(x, z) = D(x, z, y*, u*)(1 - a) for driver 1 and a fine P2(y, u) =
D(x*, z*, y, u)a for driver 2. By conditioning fines on the efficient care and activity levels of
the other drivers, the costs which fines internalise only depend on the drivers' own choices.
Such fines allow for the following statement:
Proposition 2
In a setting of bilateral care and activity choices by risk-neutral agents, raising the required
standard of care sufficiently above the efficient level and fining agents who violate the stan-
dard with a positive probability, independently of the occurrence of an accident, can induce
efficient care and activity choices.
The proof for Proposition 2 proceeds as follows (for details see the appendix). Assume that
driver 2 chooses efficient levels of care and activity u* and y*. Driver 1 then maximises
G(x, z) - aD(x, z, y*, u*) + P1(x, z) = G(x, z) - D(x, z, y*, u*). This yields the efficient
outcomes x* and z*. The same is true for driver 2, given optimal choices by driver 1. Thus, if
an equilibrium other than the optimal one exists, it needs to be characterised by choices of
care and/or activity which deviate from their efficient levels. It is finally shown that there is no
such equilibrium for any possible value of a. Hence, the correct specification of the fine also
allows for efficient outcomes in a bilateral care and activity setting.
4. Extensions
In order to evaluate the robustness of the proposition that non-accident related fines can
induce efficient behaviour, two extensions of the basic framework are looked at, namely the
existence of risk-aversion and the combination of accident-related (punitive) fines and non-
accident related payments. In the context of accident law the assumption of risk-neutral
drivers allows to focus on the incentives for efficient care and activity choices but to ignore
the consequences of variations in payoffs across different states of nature. However, the
optimality of specific liability rules may no longer hold if the party which bears the costs of an
accident is not risk-neutral. This is because the payoff in the case of an accident, G(x, z) -
D(x, z) for driver 1 in the model of Section 3, and assuming the correct incentives for efficient
behaviour, i. e. a = 1, is significantly lower than in the absence of an accident, G(x, z). Thus,8
the expected utility of a risk-averse driver EU = vU[G(x, z) - D(x, z)/v] + (1 - v)U[G(x, z)],
where v is the probability of an accident and U the strictly concave utility function, U' > 0, U''
< 0, is less than the utility of the expected payoff U[G(x, z) - D(x, z)]. If such a trade-off
between efficient incentives for care and activity choices and an optimal distribution of risk
occurs, in general, clear-cut statements about optimal rules will no longer be feasible (Shavell
1987). Basically, the same problem arises in the model presented here. However, it can be
argued that the impact of risk-aversion is less pronounced than in the predominating models
of accident law. This will be the case if fine payments are incurred sufficiently often and
effectively become certain fines because drivers cannot avoid them. In such a setting, the
payoff variation due to an accident for driver 1 is only aD(x, z), since (1 - a)D(x, z) = P1(x, z)
is incurred as a (quasi-) certain fine payment. Hence, the existence of non-accident related
fines mitigates the payoff variation due to accidents and, therefore, weakens the conflict
between efficient incentives and optimal risk allocation.
The theoretical results have generally been illustrated with reference to road traffic. A pertain-
ing feature of road traffic is the co-existence of accident-related penalties and accident-inde-
pendent fines for traffic violations. Suppose, therefore, that a driver is fined in the event of an
accident and let the accident-related fine W depend on care and activity choices, W = W(x, z).
The fine cannot be avoided by a sufficiently high care level, but only be reduced and can
include a punitive damage payment. For simplicity, a setting of unilateral decisions is
analysed. Finally, let the probability of being fined in the case of an accident be q(x, z). The
driver's expected payoff, given the co-existence of accident-related fines W and accident-
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From equation (7), it is obvious that accident-related fines can be employed to induce efficient
outcomes if they exactly compensate for those expected costs of an accident which are not
internalised. However, given a positive probability that no fine is incurred despite an accident,
because of no legal obligation to report an accident or due to hit-and-run behaviour, W has to
be fairly high to warrant full internalisation. Whether accident-related punitive damages or
non-accident-related fines are employed, may, thus, be an issue of political expediency,
enforcement costs or technology. The fundamental suitability of fines  % P which are unrelated
to the occurrence of an accident for achieving efficiency is not altered by their co-existence
with punitive damages. Given q W (x, z) < (1 -  a)D(x, z), an expected fine  %( , ) P x z  =
(1 - a)D(x, z) - q W(x, z) would achieve this objective. However, such an act-based fine
requires an excessive standard while harm-based payments necessitate excessive, i.e. punitive
damages.9
5. Discussion
The above analysis has shown that act-based sanctions can induce efficient behaviour. There
are a number of advantages of act-based or non-accident related fines over other mechanisms
to induce efficient behaviour especially in a world of bilateral care and activity choices. First,
in comparison to harm-based, punitive sanctions, act-based fines can probably not be evaded
as easily as it will be possible if fines are only imposed in the case of accidents and the
incentives for hit-and-run behaviour are pronounced. Second, since high activity drivers are
likely to be fined more often than low activity drivers, for a given level of care, fines for the
violation of traffic rules can be made dependent on the level of activity without the need to the
observe activity choices for each individual driver in the case of an accident. Third, moderate
fines for the violation of traffic regulations are an established element of many legal systems,
whereas 'full-cost' fines in the case of an accident are not. Thus, there are substantial argu-
ments for a system of repeated but modest fines.
However, there are also disadvantages of a system of double strict liability. This mechanism
to achieve efficiency increases the aggregate costs of an activity beyond its actual level
because the full expected accident costs are imposed on all parties. If individuals compare the
payoff from driving and another activity which is not burdened by the double strict liability
rule, the choice between these two activities will be biased towards the second activity. Thus,
although the marginal incentives may be correct, the absolute costs are inflated such that too
little participation is chosen. However, this criticism applies to all systems of double strict
liability. In addition, an elaborate system of monetary fines involves substantial operating
costs. Finally, a system of act-based fines in a world with a variable activity level requires the
willingness to model agents as not adhering to legal standards. In contrast to a setting with
harm-based liability rules which individuals always adhere to, a world with fines which are
independent of the occurrence of an accident can elucidate the observation that norms are
violated.10
6. References
Arlen, Jennifer H. (1990), Re-Examining Liability Rules when Injurers as well as Victims
Suffer Losses, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 10, 233-239.
de Meza, David (1986), The Efficiency of Liability Law, International Review of Law and
Economics, Vol. 6, 107-113.
Edlin, Aaron S. (1999), Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance, NBER Working Paper 6934.
Finsinger, Jorg and Mark V. Pauly (1990), The Double Liability Rule, The Geneva Papers on
Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol. 15(2), 159-169.
Green, Jerry (1976), On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws, Bell Journal of Economics,
Vol. 7, 553-574.
Hindley, Brian and Bill Bishop (1983), Accident Liability Rules and Externality, International
Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 59-68.
Landes, Elisabeth M. (1982), Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: a Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation of the Effect of No-fault Insurance, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 25, 49-
65.
Litman, Todd (1997), Distance-based Vehicle Insurance as a TDM Strategy, Transportation
Quarterly, Vol. 51(3), 119-137.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2000), The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, 45-76.
Shavell, Steven (1980), Strict Liability versus Negligence, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9,
1-25.
Shavell, Steven (1987), Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Shavell, Steven (1993), The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, Vol. 36, 255-287.
Tullock, Gordon (1981), Negligence Again, International Review of Law and Economics,
Vol. 1, 51-62.
Vickrey, William (1968), Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An
Economist's Critique, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 33, 464-487.
Wittman, Donald (1981), Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation
of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 10, 65-91.11
7. Appendix: Equilibrium with Bilateral Care and Activity Choices
Assume that the fine for driver 1 is P1(x, z) = D(x, z, y*, u*)(1 - a) while that for driver 2 is
given by P2(y, u) = D(x*, z*, y, u)a. Such fines induce both types of drivers to select the effi-
cient levels of activity and care, z* and x*, and u* and y*, respectively. The proof proceeds as
follows: first, it is shown that the best response by driver 1 to an efficient behaviour by driver
2 is to select the efficient care and activity levels, and that the same argument holds for driver
2. Thus, any equilibrium other than the efficient one must involve a deviation from efficient
behaviour by both drivers. Subsequently, it is demonstrated that it cannot be optimal for driver
1 to select values of z and x, such that z „ z* and/or x „ x*, if driver 2 has selected u „ u*
and/or y „ y*. However, if driver 1 selects z = z* and x = x*, driver 2 will also make efficient
choices, that is u = u* and y = y*.
Assume that y = y* and u = u* hold. Given P1(x, z) = D(x, z, y*, u*)(1 - a), the maximisation
of drivers 1's objective W1 is then equivalent to the maximisation of W (cf. equations (1) and
(2)). Thus, if driver 2 selects the efficient care and activity levels, so will driver 1 do. An
analogous argument for driver 2 shows that P2(y, u) = D(x*, z*, y, u)a will ensure u = u* and
y = y* if driver 1 has chosen z = z* and x = x*.
Thus, another equilibrium than the efficient one will only exist if both drivers deviate from the
optimal outcome. The payoff from deviation for driver 1 [2] for an arbitrary value of a, given
a non-efficient behaviour by driver 2 [1], is denoted W1 = W1(a, z, x) [W2 = W2(a, y, u)]:
W1(a, z, x) ” G(x, z) - aD(x, z, y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*) (A.1)
W2(a, y, u) ” G(y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y, u) - aD(x*, z*, y, u) (A.2)
The payoff for driver 1 from selecting the efficient levels of care and activity, given non-effi-
cient behaviour by driver 2, is denoted by W1* = W1*(a, z*, x*). The payoff for driver 2 is
defined accordingly. It will be profitable for driver 1 not to choose care and/or activity levels
efficiently if W1 > W1* holds. This implies:
W1 ” G(x, z) - aD(x, z, y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*)
> G(x*, z*) - aD(x*, z*, y, u) - (1 - a)D(x*, z*, y*, u*) ” W1* (A.3)
An according computation for a driver 2 yields as a condition for not making the efficient
choices:
W2 ” G(y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y, u) - aD(x*, z*, y, u)
> G(y*, u*) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*) - aD(x*, z*, y*, u*) ” W2* (A.4)
Since non-efficient levels of care and activity will only be chosen if both drivers deviate, the
inequalities captured by (A.3) and (A.4) must both hold simultaneously. Thus, a necessary
requirement for deviation to be an equilibrium is W1 + W2 > W1* + W2*. However, this
requirement contradicts the assumption that x*, z*, y*, and u* uniquely maximise W, since:
W1 + W2  = G(x, z) - D(x, z, y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*) + G(y, u) - aD(x*, z*, y, u)
    = W(x, z, y, u) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*) - aD(x*, z*, y, u)
< W(x*, z*, y*, u*) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*) - aD(x*, z*, y, u)
   = G(x*, z*) - aD(x*, z*, y, u) - D(x*, z*, y*, u*) + G(y*, u*) - (1 - a)D(x, z, y*, u*)
   = W1* + W2*  (A.5)